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 This note argues that the United States needs to utilize current federal agencies to begin 
introducing cyber supply chain risk management regulation for IT supply chains. Cyber supply 
chain risk management is a critical area of cybersecurity that has barely been recognized by the 
United States government. The globalization of the digital world has introduced a new spectrum 
of risk management issues that affect the products exchanged by businesses and consumed by 
individuals and government agencies. While there have been some initiatives toward the 
promotion of tighter cybersecurity regulation, most initiatives only concern the public sector, 
leaving the private sector vulnerable. This note argues that the United States needs to redeploy 
existing federal agencies to begin introducing cyber supply chain risk management regulation for 



















Cybersecurity is an issue on the forefront of every industry. Governments, 
businesses, and consumers alike have been introduced to cybersecurity and the many 
dangers that a “cyberattack” poses. For the purposes of this note, a “cyberattack” is defined 
as “a deliberate infiltration of a computer system or network with the intent to either extract or 
destroy confidential information to destroy the functioning of the system or network.”1 Thus, the 
threat of a cyberattack is something that affects every American, not just the 40 million 
consumers whose credit card information has been stolen when hackers use malware2 to digitally 
compromise computer systems.3	
As evidenced by the high profile attacks of 2014 and 2015, cyberattacks are becoming a 
broader trend, with increasing frequency and ferocity “posing grave threats to the national 
interests of the United States.”4 For example, today there are a total of 22,393,098 different 
strands of malware, 3,045,722 of which are new strains created between January and June of 
2015.5  
The complexities of cyberattacks are growing exponentially, endangering nearly every 
entity within the public and private sectors. Though many of these cyberattacks are not well 
known or picked up by the media, there have been a series of dangerous consequences regarding 
cybersecurity, especially within the private sector.  
For example, in December 2015, Juniper Networks warned of a vulnerability that had 
been ongoing for two years before discovery.6 The firmware that Juniper Networks uses to 
provide firewalls and virtual public networks for government agencies and the financial services 
sectors was “backdoored,”7 resulting in a data breach. The Juniper vulnerabilities are an example 
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of exactly how dangerous encryption backdoors8 can be for malicious actors to use at their 
disposal and why it is important for stricter cybersecurity initiatives within the private sector.  
Another recent example of a cyberattack is the malicious hacking of the Hollywood 
Presbyterian Medical Center in February 2016.9 A hacker seized control of the hospital’s 
computer systems and demanded a ransom in return for the decryption key needed to restore the 
computer systems.10 While there appears to have been no loss of life or significant damage from 
the attack, it is evident that this type of cyberattack could do significant damage under other 
circumstances.  
Though there have been proposals, legislative acts, executive orders, and studies 
conducted regarding cybersecurity, there is a lack of acknowledgement of the risks associated 
with the IT supply chain. The IT supply chain is a major source of vital technological products 
the country as a whole relies on, and there are serious vulnerabilities within the supply chain that 
must be addressed through proper cyber supply chain risk management (SCRM) procedures. As 
Michael Hayden, former C.I.A. and N.S.A. director warned, “[d]anger is everywhere and also 
nowhere; being invisible, cyber crime is easy to put out of your mind…[it] is faceless and creeps 
in on little cat feet. You know that, like death, it’s coming, but all you can do is hope that 
someone will fix it before it comes for you.”11 While cybersecurity may be an invisible threat, it 
is simply too important to ignore. 
This note will argue for the redeployment of existing federal agencies to begin 
introducing cyber SCRM into IT supply chains. Of the various types of cybersecurity threats 
within the supply chain, the threat of malicious hardware is of particular concern. Recent 
legislative attempts to regulate cybersecurity have only addressed certain federal agencies, 
leaving the private sector with a framework that is on a voluntary basis.12  
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Part II of this note will provide a background into the global nature of the supply chain, 
and how this reliance creates security vulnerabilities, as well as the impact on businesses. Part III 
will discuss the current initiatives attempting to address the nation’s cybersecurity needs. This 
includes a discussion of the legislative and executive initiatives, the private sector’s 
cybersecurity initiatives, and the European Union’s recent cybersecurity standard. Finally, Part 
IV will propose slowly regulating cyber SCRM through the use of current federal agencies, such 
as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Once the federal government begins to introduce 
cyber SCRM regulation, the government can begin to establish a more permanent regulatory 
framework for both the public and private sectors, 
II. THE SUPPLY CHAIN & THE AFFECT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY  
Industrialized nations’ social order relies on technology for all types of industries, from 
communication to entertainment, safety to medicine, transportation to national security. 
Technology has become so commonplace that there is no question from where or how the pieces 
of these technological devices end up in computers, phones, vehicles, pacemakers, televisions, or 
other devices. The reality, of course, is that each part of our technological devices is created with 
the help of numerous hands, from all over the world. In other words, these devices are products 
of the supply chain.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has defined “supply chain” 
as “a set of organizations, people, activities, information and resources for creating and moving a 
product or service from suppliers through to an organization’s customers.”13 Supply chains are 
not a new concept, especially on the regulatory front. However, the technological boom in the 
last century introduced a new set of risks to supply chains, especially regarding the field of 
information technology (IT), which includes equipment such as software, firmware, and services 
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used in the collection of data or information.14 This  “supply chain risk” is defined as the “risk 
that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert 
the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or 
maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the 
function, use, or operation of such system.”15 
To narrow the vast nature of IT for the purposes of this note, it is essential to understand 
three different elements within IT products. The first element is hardware, which is commonly 
referred to as the physical component of a computer, such as the motherboard, hard drive, and 
RAM.16 Hardware also includes “computer chips, which process and complete the work needed 
to perform a given task.”17  
  Working together with hardware for the essential functions of technological devices is 
the second element, firmware, which “is the essential, embedded software needed for basic 
hardware operation.”18 Firmware operates as a “software program or set of instructions 
programmed on a hardware device [providing] the necessary instructions for how the device 
communicates with the other computer hardware.”19  
The third element includes embedded systems, which are components of both hardware 
and firmware. Embedded systems are typically housed on a microprocessor board with the 
programs stored in ROM.20 Virtually all devices with a digital interface have embedded systems, 
including cars, microwaves, televisions, and wrist watches.21 Due to their prevalence in devices, 
“embedded systems often provide critical functions that could be sabotaged by malicious 
parties…[by] send[ing] or receiv[ing] sensitive or critical information using public networks or 
communications channels accessible to potential attackers…”22  
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An example of how vulnerable hardware may become while in the supply chain is the 
design and manufacture of computer chips. The critical, everyday devices chips are found in, 
such as small scale cell phones and computers to large scale power grids, can only run properly if 
the chips they contain are free of malware.23 Chip design has become a global enterprise, with 
around 1500 companies in the world dedicated to it.24 The full “chip ecosystem,” consisting of 
designers, manufacturers, companies that use chips in products, individuals, and other entities 
that purchase these products, all rely on the assumption that the chips designed are reliable and 
secure.25 Because chip hardware generally cannot be changed once the chip leaves the factory, 
malware “can only be inserted by someone who can access and alter the design before it is 
manufactured and placed in a product.”26 For example, “the design process for a single chip can 
involve contributions from hundreds of people, many of whom may be employed by third party 
companies that simply provide functional blocks and who have little or no stake or interest in the 
success of the chip.”27  
The microscopic nature of chips also makes them vulnerable to malware.28 Outsourcing 
within the chip industry has been a significant contributor to the list of potential vectors for the 
insertion of malware.29 Though outsourcing has economic benefits, including lower labor costs 
and competition in the industry, “the combination of growth in both complexity and outsourcing 
means that the number of people with access to the design for a single chip during its 
development can easily number in the hundreds.”30 While outsourcing the design and 
manufacture of hardware in the supply chain is part of a global economy, there are still ever-
present threats to the security of the hardware being produced and sold to companies and 
governments that rely on privacy and national security.  
	 7	
Due to the global nature of the essential elements of IT products, the threat of potential 
malicious attack is prevalent. It is dire for components within technological devices to safeguard 
the data that the country’s privacy and national security rely upon. 
The Global Nature of the Supply Chain  
 
Globalization has been greatly aided by technological advancement, causing the IT 
marketplace to rely on global supply chains to meet its growing needs.31 Today, IT supply chains 
include multiple organizations and regions for production, making the supply chain difficult to 
manage.32 These supply chains include important products that the world relies upon, such as 
“servers, routers, and personal computers…that are globally sourced.”33 Due to the “expansive 
and international field of technology suppliers…these [products] [are] often created with pieces 
[from] many different companies,”34 making it difficult to narrow down where each part of the 
product came from, let alone to a single country. As a result, governments have less insight and 
less control over how these suppliers conduct their operations, leaving security gaps in the global 
supply chain.35 
Because many participants in the supply chain do not have an interest in the success of 
these products, or may be an adversary, the reliance of the United States on the global supply 
chain presents risks. These include “threats posed by actors – such as foreign intelligence 
services or counterfeiters – who may exploit vulnerabilities in the supply chain,”36 which affects 
national security, privacy of our information, and the physical infrastructure of our county. With 
this in mind, the main concern is that “an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce 
unwanted functions, or otherwise subvert design, integrity, manufacturing, production, 
distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a system in order to conduct 
surveillance…deny access to, disrupt, or…degrade its reliability or trustworthiness.”37 
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Specifically, the insertion of malware into the devices within the supply chain, the creation of 
“back doors,” and the threat of counterfeit hardware are three of the potential risks posed by the 
lack of strong cybersecurity measures that prevent and mitigate harm. 
Significant damage is caused when an attacker uses the supply chain to intentionally 
insert malware into the hardware or firmware of a product, allowing attackers to take control and 
“read, modify, or delete sensitive information; disrupt operations; [or] launch attacks against 
other organizations’ systems.”38 Because firmware and hardware are intertwined, if malware is 
inserted into the firmware of a component, it is extremely difficult to detect due to the 
microscopic nature of the circuits that the malware would be hiding in,39 making the piece of 
hardware appear legitimate. Dangerously enough, “it is possible to look directly at malicious 
firmware and not see anything wrong with it [because] cleverly written malware will perform the 
kinds of operations that the system is routinely supposed to perform…[but] at exactly the wrong 
time.”40 By attacking the hardware of IT products while in the supply chain, an attacker then has 
many opportunities at his fingertips, including overt and covert attacks, the creation of 
backdoors, and the insertion of counterfeit hardware. 
 Once malicious code is inserted into the hardware, an attacker is able to launch various 
types of attacks, including overt and covert attacks. An overt attack allows the malicious 
hardware to either cease all functioning or impair the functioning of the product.41 Here, the 
existence of a problem would be recognized, although the cause of the problem would not be 
clear.42 For example, an overt attack of a mobile phone would cause nothing more than 
inconvenience, however, that same type of attack on a larger scale could be devastating for 
national infrastructure.43 On the contrary, a covert attack causes the appearance of normal 
operation, while the malicious action quietly works in the background.44 An example would be a 
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corrupted computer chip within a system that could send copies of confidential data to any third-
party destination, without the user’s knowledge.45  
Another type of covert attack is one that leaves the device operating normally, but 
introduces corruption to the data at some point in time, not necessarily right away. For example, 
placing a location-based trigger into the malicious code can attack the hardware of a GPS chip.46 
This would leave the GPS functioning normally, until it is reaches a certain geographic region, at 
which time the trigger would shift the GPS locations by a few hundred feet. This type of attack 
would not be easily detectable in advance.47 These attacks showcase the variations of which an 
attacker can manipulate hardware to trigger the attacks months, even years later. 
The creation of “backdoors”48 is another type of attack. In general, a backdoor is “a 
malicious program that can potentially give an intruder remote access to an infected computer.”49 
Backdoor creation presents a hidden method for bypassing normal computer authentication 
systems, and is not limited to malware because it also affects chips and memory.50 One type of a 
backdoor is “ticking time bombs,” which allows the attacker to program the backdoor to 
automatically trigger “after a pre-determined fixed amount of time after the power-on of a 
device.”51 This could force the device to crash or operate maliciously52 making it clear that this 
could be a devastating attack on a large scale. This type of backdoor has the potential to allow an 
attacker to “design a kill switch function that could be undetectable by any validation 
methods.”53  
Furthermore, the installation of counterfeit software and hardware is another significant 
risk to the IT supply chain. Counterfeit information technology is hardware or software that 
contains non-genuine components or code.54 The United States Department of Defense has 
reported that counterfeit products threaten the “integrity, trustworthiness, and reliability of 
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information systems” because they are usually (1) “less reliable and therefore fail more often and 
more quickly than genuine parts,” and (2) “counterfeiting presents an opportunity for the 
insertion of malware or backdoors into the copies that would be more difficult in more secure 
manufacturing facilities.”55  
Counterfeit components are prevalent among many IT products. A March 2013 study by 
the International Data Corporation “found that at least one-third of all PC software is 
counterfeit.”56 The result of counterfeit software causes users to experience decreased computer 
performance, viruses, spam, or complete failure of the software or computer. Counterfeit 
hardware is even more difficult to identify and remedy because of the use of backdoors, which 
could automatically activate malware or wait for the command of a certain date or location.57  
The harmful effects of counterfeit hardware are exhibited in a recent example affecting 
the public sector. In October 2011, two people were convicted of selling 59,000 counterfeit 
circuits produced in China to the U.S. military to be used on U.S. warships, airplanes, and 
missiles.58 Through the use of counterfeit hardware, the fake circuits could have “potentially 
contained serious vulnerabilities that could have disabled, impaired, or stolen information from 
these important systems.”59 Additionally, the Commerce Department has reported a “doubling of 
counterfeit incidents between 2005 and 2008 to more than 9,356 cases.”60 
The various tools that attackers have at their disposal are worrisome. These types of 
attacks are the result of hackers that prey upon the vulnerabilities of a system. Because of this, it 
is vita to have tightened cybersecurity measures to detect and prevent potential cyberattacks.  
Vulnerabilities 
 
In 2012 the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) was instructed to 
study and identify risks associated with IT supply chains used by federal agencies, and how 
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national security-related departments have been addressing these risks.61 The study found that 
reliance on the global supply chain leads to many risks posed that could adversely affect 
government agencies’ missions. The study identified and described four supply chain 
vulnerabilities that can be threatened by the installation of hardware that contains malicious 
code.62  These vulnerabilities include (1) the lack of adequate testing for software updates and 
patches,63 (2) Incomplete information on IT suppliers, (3) the use of supply chain delivery and 
storage mechanisms that are not secure, and (4) the acquisition of information technology 
products or parts from independent distributors, brokers, and the gray market.64 
The lack of adequate testing for software updates and patches occurs when system 
updates or patches go untested, which increases the risk that an attacker could insert malware 
into the system.65 An example of this would be an agency or contractor that “fails to validate the 
authenticity of patches with suppliers,” leading to an attacker being able to write fake patches 
that could potentially allow unauthorized access to the system.66 Lack of adequate testing for 
updates leaves devices vulnerable to the threat of the installation of hardware or software 
containing malware.67  
Incomplete information on IT suppliers occurs when IT equipment is acquired without 
understanding the “supplier’s past performance or corporate structure.”68 By not inquiring into 
the past performance of a supplier, there could be the risk of deficient products, or the supplier 
could be an adversary who would now have access to sensitive information.69 For example, 
without background knowledge as to who the supplier is and what the structure of the supplier 
includes, the agency acquiring the IT equipment would not be able to know if the supplier or 
their employees “are subject to undue foreign control or influence.”70 Inadequate information 
regarding the IT supplier leaves devices vulnerable to the installation of hardware or software 
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containing malware, the installation of hardware or software that contains unintentional 
vulnerabilities, the installation of counterfeit hardware or software, failure or disruption in the 
production or distribution of critical products, and the possible reliance on a malicious or 
unqualified service provider for the performance of technical services.71 
The use of supply chain delivery and storage mechanisms that are not secure causes an 
increased risk that the IT product would be threatened while in transit to the purchaser.72 This 
vulnerability could allow “a[n] [attacker] to gain unauthorized access to the IT product, thereby 
facilitating unauthorized modification, substitution, or diversion.”73 Ultimately, this could lead to 
the exposure of sensitive information74 without the knowledge of the purchaser. The use of 
unsecure delivery and storage mechanisms leaves devices vulnerable to the threat of the 
installation of hardware or software containing malware, and the installation of counterfeit 
hardware or software. 
The acquisition of information technology products or parts from independent 
distributors, brokers, and the gray market increases the risk of encountering substandard, 
subverted, and counterfeit products.75 Independent distributors purchase products for the purpose 
of redistributing them back into the market, without any contractual agreement with the original 
manufacturer or brokers, that works to locate parts that customer’s request.76 Here, “the gray 
market refers to the trade of parts through distribution channels that, while legal, are unofficial, 
unauthorized, or unintended by the original component manufacturer.”77 Dealing with 
independent distributors and brokers leave devices vulnerable to counterfeit products. 
Although the GAO report was commissioned for purposes related to federal agencies, 
these vulnerabilities are applicable to both the public and private sector. Many recent examples 
of hardware attacks in consumer products prove how real of a threat cyber attacks can be. To 
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illustrate the ease of attacking the hardware of common, everyday devices, two examples are 
detailed below – personal computers and USB drives. 
In 2014, Lenovo, one of the world’s largest sellers of personal computers,78 began pre-
installing “Superfish”79 to their products to make it easier to “shop for deals” on the web, and 
consequently allowed attackers access to a person’s Internet traffic and browser history.80 
“Superfish intentionally pokes a gigantic hole into your browser security and allows anyone on 
your Wi-Fi network to hijack your browser silently and collect your bank credentials, passwords, 
and anything else you might conceivably type there.”81 Robert Graham, a cybersecurity 
enthusiast from Errata Security, tested the vulnerability of Superfish, finding it incredibly easy to 
attack because he was able to intercept the encrypted communications of Superfish victims all 
while “hanging out near them at a café wifi hotspot.”82 What makes Superfish unusually 
dangerous is that it is not just another program like Microsoft or Adobe, it is a code that is hidden 
from everyday users.83 This is one of the best examples of a hardware “attack”84 because 
Superfish was inserted into the Lenovo computers while they were still in production.  
It may seem inconceivable that something like this could happen, however, since the 
1990s, it has been commonplace for software and programs showing ads to be preloaded without 
the permission of consumers.85 Essentially, consumers trust that their devices will not come with 
vulnerabilities like Superfish, but the reality is that this common practice puts consumers at risk 
for cyber threats.86  
Another common device that has been easily attacked are USB drives, also commonly 
referred to as thumbdrives. These small devices help transport data and information from 
multiple devices. One of the problems with a USB attack is that these devices were not designed 
to prevent exploitation.87 This was proven in July 2014, when two researchers from the Security 
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Research Labs in Berlin announced their discovery of how to overwrite a USB device’s firmware 
and carry out malicious actions.88  
The experiment, labeled “BadUSB,” showed how an attacker can hack and reprogram 
embedded firmware to give a USB device “new, covert capabilities,” such as “transforming 
keyboards, web cams, and other types of USB-connected devices into highly programmable 
attack platforms that can’t be detected…”89 This is especially dangerous because it is impossible 
for the host device to detect the malicious firmware code, but the firmware code is able to 
interact and modify the host computer’s software unbeknownst to the user.90 The malicious code 
is capable of planting other malware in the device, stealing the device’s information, and 
diverting Internet traffic – “all while bypassing antivirus scans.”91 In order to detect a tampered 
device, advanced forensic methods, including physically disassembling and reverse engineering 
the device, is required.92 In addition to lack of detection, BadUSB-corrupted devices are hard to 
disinfect. “Because the tampering resides in the firmware, the malware can be eliminated only by 
replacing the booby-trapped device software with the original firmware.”93 
As alarming as these examples may appear, they are simply the “tip of the iceberg” 
because “any hardware device plugged into your computer with a firmware component can 
probably be made malicious.”94 Despite the pressing need for governmental action in preventing 
these types of cyberattacks, the current state of the law does not address these types of threats.  
The Impact on Business Interests 
Businesses are major actors in the IT supply chain, making the security of their products 
a top priority to not only safeguard products for government and consumer use, but also to 
inhibit the costs of potential cyberattacks. Cybersecurity has a substantial impact on the 
international business realm, especially economically. To enhance this point, it is important to 
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examine the impact upon business leaders as expressed through reports and surveys of key 
stakeholders in the business realm. 
In general, cybercrime costs the global economy about $450 billion each year, exceeding 
both the U.S. farming and oil-and-gas markets.95 A recent report on global risks from the World 
Economic Forum “found U.S. CEOs are more concerned about cyber-related threats and attacks 
than fiscal crises, asset bubbles and energy prices.”96 
Furthermore, a recent survey conducted by Mayer Brown LLP, taken from top executives 
and corporate counsel, demonstrates the importance of cyber SCRM in the private sector. The 
scope of the survey ranged from fifteen different industry sectors, including financial institutions, 
professional services, utilities, energy, and healthcare.97 The survey asked the respondents a 
number of questions regarding the biggest threat their companies face, the effectiveness of 
NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework, and their overall outlook on cybersecurity. The survey results 
revealed the importance of cybersecurity in the private sector, especially for the prevention of 
data breaches. For example, of those surveyed, 63% considered the disclosure of personally 
identifiable information as the biggest cyber threat to their companies.98  Cyberattacks are a 
serious threat to businesses, especially considering the economic consequences in the aftermath 
of a cyberattack.99  
The results of the survey also revealed that businesses anticipate more support from the 
federal government, with 84% of respondents stating they expect clear, national standards on 
data breach notification to emerge within the next five years.100 This references the federal 
government’s creation of multiple levels of authority within agencies and sub-agencies that cause 
confusion, especially when there are various reporting standards, rather than one clear set of 
standards for information security.101  
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Interestingly enough, though they may be aware of the risks of cyberattack, the majority 
of U.S. businesses are completely unprepared for cyberattacks. This is evident by the percentage 
of companies reporting losses of $1 million or more due to cybercrime, a number that has 
doubled since 2014.102 For example, the 2016 Global Economic Crime Survey conducted by 
PwC found that only 48% of U.S. respondents103 had a first-responder team that handles cyber-
related incidents.104		
These various survey results all reflect the importance of cybersecurity in business, and 
because the very essence of business has become globally digitalized, the security of the 
products being exchanged through the IT supply chain is of utmost importance.  




Today, multiple federal agencies have initiatives to better address cybersecurity, but most 
of these are directed toward the public sector. Over the past decade, presidents, executive 
departments, and federal agencies have all addressed cybersecurity needs. Presidents George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama have both addressed cybersecurity through the use of executive 
orders.105 In addition, the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense each have prominent 
roles within cybersecurity, especially the Department of Homeland Security, which has several 
sub-departments that address various sectors of cybersecurity. Finally, federal agencies have a 
role to play as well, especially the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), which 
created a voluntary cyber risk management framework for the use in both the public and private 
sectors. 
In 2008 President Bush launched the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 
(CNCI) as a part of his National Security Presidential Directive/Homeland Security Presidential 
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Directive.106 The CNCI set out a list of initiatives to better address the United States’ growing 
cybersecurity needs. Of particular significance is Initiative 11, which is a multipronged approach 
to address global supply chain risk management, stemming from both domestic and global 
supply chains.107 The risks stemming from the supply chain require strategic and comprehensive 
management “over the entire life cycle of products, systems, and services.”108 Initiative 11 
further details that this management will require,  
a greater awareness of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with 
acquisition decisions; the development and employment of tools and resources to 
technically and operationally mitigate risk across the life cycle of products (from design 
through retirement); the development of new acquisition policies and practices that 
reflect the complex global marketplace; and partnership with industry to develop and 
adopt supply chain and risk management standards and best practices.109 
 
After taking office, President Obama addressed the seriousness of cybersecurity and adopted the 
CNCI, but was advised to build upon it because the Initiative needed some updating and 
evolving to fit the current needs of the country.110  
In its report on the IT Supply Chain in March 2012, the GAO examined the effectiveness 
of the CNCI, and found that it faced many challenges meeting its objectives,111 including 
defining the roles and responsibilities of oversight, establishing measures of effectiveness, and 
transparency, especially regarding supply chain management.112 One of the greatest setbacks for 
cybersecurity risk management is the lack of uniform oversight. Rather than having one body of 
management, there are currently several departments and agencies that address cybersecurity 
needs. Though there are a number of agencies with roles to play, this note will focus of the 
oversight of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), 
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  
Due to the vast nature of cyberspace, including the number of malicious actors that can 
operate from anywhere in the world, the physical link between cyberspace and critical 
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infrastructure, and the difficulty in handling every vulnerability of complex cyber networks, the 
DHS has become instrumental in cyber risk management.113 As DHS has recognized, with 
increasingly sophisticated IT systems, the risk of cyber threats upon infrastructure that affects the 
daily lives of millions of Americans is of grave concern, and therefore warrant the creation of 
multiple sub-agencies within the Department.114 The DHS boasts an ample amount of legal 
authority “to serve as the central repository and distributor of cyber-intelligence for the federal 
government.”115 Although agencies are important in addressing cybersecurity in the country, the 
authorities often overlap, “resulting in confusion as to which of the multiple sub-agencies within 
DHS or even outside DHS” should be managing which threats.116 It is also important to note that 
out of the various agencies, advisory groups, and other components of the DHS, there is no 
specific agency to address cyber SCRM.117 
  For example, in 2006 Congress created the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications 
(CS&C), which is responsible for enhancing security, resilience, and reliability while protecting 
the public and private sectors from disruptions to critical infrastructure.118 The CS&C carries out 
this mission through its five divisions: the Office of Emergency Communications, the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber 
Infrastructure Resilience, Federal Network Reliance, and Network Security Deployment.119 
These sub-agencies each have their own goals addressing aspects of cybersecurity, with the 
exception of the supply chain.120 
In addition to the DHS, the Department of Defense (DoD) also has a role in 
cybersecurity. The DoD works with other U.S. government agencies to help defend the U.S. 
homeland and interests from attack, including those attacks that occur in cyberspace.121 In the 
Department’s 2015 Cyber Strategy report, the DoD addressed its three primary missions in 
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cyberspace. First, recognizing its own dependence on cyberspace for training, organizing, and 
equipping the U.S. military, the DoD “must defend its own networks, systems, and information” 
first.122 Second, to address the significant consequences of cyberattacks such as adverse foreign 
policy, property damage, economic impact, and possibly loss of life, the DoD “must be prepared 
to defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks or significant consequence.”123 
Third, in case of cyber military attacks against adversaries or to protect U.S. interests, the DoD 
“must be able to provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and 
contingency plans.”124 The DoD’s role in cybersecurity is a defense mechanism to be employed 
when the nation’s cyber vulnerabilities are breached.  
Following the failure of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012,125 President Obama issued 
Executive Order 13,636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity EO).126 
The Cybersecurity EO called for increased information sharing between federal agencies and the 
private sector, and it also called upon “federal agencies to address privacy and civil liberties 
concerns at the highest agency levels.”127 The Cybersecurity EO makes the Attorney General, 
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence the principal 
coordinators of the EO.128  
In addition, the Secretary of Homeland Security must work with the Director of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to “lead the development of a framework 
to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure (the Framework).”129 The Cybersecurity EO 
requires the Cybersecurity Framework to “include a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, 
and processes that align policy, business, and technological approaches to address cyber risks” 
while also aiming to incorporate voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices to the 
fullest extent possible.”130 
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The Framework’s purpose is to be a flexible, repeatable, cost effective approach to the 
reduction of cyber threats.131 The Framework consists of a collaboration of federal agencies and 
other stakeholders, giving those within the public and private sectors the opportunity for an open 
public review and comment process.132 The Framework is implemented as a part of the 
“Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Program established by the Secretary in 
conjunction”133 with other agencies in order to support the “adoption of a Cybersecurity 
Framework by owners and operators of critical infrastructure and any other interested 
entities.”134 The Cybersecurity EO does address important cybersecurity risk management 
efforts, however, it does not explicitly reference the issue of cyber SCRM.135 
As a result of the Cybersecurity EO, NIST launched the first version of the Cybersecurity 
Framework (the Framework), in 2014, along with a “Roadmap” to outline NIST’s next steps, and 
to identify key areas of cybersecurity development.136 Since its release, the Framework’s value 
has been validated by “a large volume and breadth of interactions between NIST and 
industry.”137  
The Framework’s most frequently cited benefit is the common cyber risk management 
language that allows for efficient and precise discussions across a company’s management 
structure, from auditors to supply chain partners.138 Another benefit of the Framework is its 
versatility. “The Framework was designed as a multi-sector document that individual sectors 
could tailor in ways that might make it more relevant and useful to organizations operating 
within their sector.”139 The availability and ease of the Framework makes it a realistic and 
workable part of any company, agency, or industry leader’s cybersecurity policy.140 
In addition to its Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Best Practices,141 in April 2015 
NIST released its Special Publication 800-161, Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for 
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Federal Information Systems and Organizations.142 Special Publication 800-161 is a 282-page 
report that painstakingly details a multi-tiered approach for federal government agencies to 
follow. The Publication addresses the concerns of federal agencies about the risks associated 
with IT products and services within the supply chain, acknowledging vulnerabilities due to 
malware, counterfeit products, and poor manufacturing practices.143 It also “provides guidance to 
federal agencies on identifying, assessing, and mitigating” IT supply chain risks, and integrates 
IT SCRM into federal agency risk management activities.144  
Along with the various executive actions taken by United States departments and 
agencies over the past several years, in 2012 President Obama announced a National Strategy for 
Global Supply Chain Security (hereafter the Strategy).145 The announcement introduced two 
goals: (1) “to promote the efficient and secure movement of goods,” and (2) “to foster a resilient 
supply chain.”146 The Strategy provides guidance to U.S. departments and agencies, and 
identifies the country’s priorities for stakeholders going forward.147  
The Strategy calls for a better understanding of supply chain threats and risks by the 
United States government, advancing technology by building more resilient critical 
infrastructures, identifying and promoting necessary legislation that prioritizes supply chain 
standards, and fostering the sharing of information and policies with industry partners, critical 
infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders.148 The Strategy addresses supply 
chain concerns in the fields of medicine, cargo, transportation, nuclear detection, national 
security, and multi-national corporations. Although there has been some progress in these areas, 
and the government has a better understanding of the threats to the supply chain, there is still 
much work to be done.  
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As President Obama’s presidency comes to a close, the Administration has been 
strengthening his legacy by attempting to increase the country’s cybersecurity spending by 35% 
as well as by attempting to establish a Cybersecurity National Action Plan.149 In the final budget 
of his presidency, President Obama has included a $19 billion cybersecurity request, $3 billion of 
which would be used to update the government’s computer systems, some of which have 
software systems dating back to the 1960s.150  
 Through the Cybersecurity National Action Plan, the Commission on Enhancing National 
Cybersecurity is to be established with the collaboration of “strategic, business, and technical 
thinkers from outside of government.”151 Given the importance of cybersecurity for government 
and consumers alike, the Commission is to focus on a National Cybersecurity Awareness Plan to 
help raise awareness about the increasing threats of the digital world upon consumers and 
businesses.  The National Action Plan is designed to help modernize current federal IT systems, 
as well as keep the citizenry informed and aware of the potential risks posed by cyber threats. In 
addition, the Plan helps establish the position of Chief Information Officer, who is to help drive 
these new initiatives across the public sector.152 While the new Cybersecurity campaign and 
initiatives are a positive step toward a more secure digital world, like the majority of other 
executive initiatives, neither the Plan nor the Commission have incorporated an in-depth solution 
towards cyber SCRM.  
With all the executive actions taken toward heightened cybersecurity, only NIST’s 
Cybersecurity Framework applies to the private sector. It is important to address federal agency 
cyber SCRM, but the private sector is just as vulnerable. While these executive actions are a 
good start towards a more secure supply chain, more legislative action in this area is needed to 
enhance the executive actions.  
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Legislative Initiatives 
There have been several legislative initiatives regarding cybersecurity, but since 2014 
only a handful has become law.153 At the end of 2014, during a lame-duck session of Congress, 
four cybersecurity bills were enacted to law.154  Aside from cybersecurity bills, Congress has 
also included cybersecurity provisions within appropriations bills for certain agencies and the 
Defense Authorization Act of which explicitly mention cyber SCRM. This section will detail the 
four cybersecurity bills enacted to law in 2014, the Appropriations Acts of 2014 and 2016, and 
the Defense Authorization Act of 2011. Just as the executive initiatives toward cybersecurity and 
cyber SCRM have been primarily focused on the public sector, the legislative actions taken thus 
far have also been focused on the public sector, leaving the private sector to its own devices.  
The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) was passed as a way to 
reform oversight of federal information systems155 by amending and modernizing the 2002 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). The amendments grant authority to the 
DHS in the implementation of security policies, shifting the focus of threats and vulnerabilities 
to data involving personal information.156  
The second act passed was the National Cybersecurity Protection Act, which amends the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002,157 essentially codifying the Department of Homeland Security’s 
National Cybersecurity and Communication Integration Center (NCCIC).158 The third act passed 
was the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act.  This Act amends the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology Act by codifying NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework.159 The fourth act is the 
Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act, which enhances cybersecurity in the workforce.160 
This Act gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to assess the cyber workforce, 
while developing, maintaining, and updating a comprehensive workforce strategy.161  
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Aside from direct cybersecurity legislation, Congress has implemented cyber SCRM into 
(1) the appropriation bills for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, NASA, and the National 
Science Foundation, and (2) the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act. In the 2015 
appropriations bill, Congress added a section that addresses specifications for the appropriation 
of funds when acquiring “high-impact” or “moderate impact” information systems.162 The bill 
prohibits the acquisition of these systems unless the agency has: (1) reviewed the supply chain 
risk against criteria developed by NIST, (2) reviewed relevant threat information provided by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and (3) consulted the FBI in assessing any risk of cyber-
espionage or sabotage associated with the acquisition of the system, including risks associated 
with production, manufacture, and assembly by entities identified by the United States as posing 
a cyber threat, especially products handled by China.163 In addition, no funds appropriated may 
be available unless the head of the assessing entity has, (1) worked with NIST to develop a 
mitigation strategy for identified risks, (2) determined that the acquisition is in the national 
interest of the United States, and (3) reported that determination to Congress.164  
In the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2011, Section 806 lists the 
“requirements for information relating to supply chain risk.”165 This section examines the rights 
of the DoD in the “covered procurement”166 of goods and services for government purposes.167 
The Act sets out specific provisions for the agency head to consider when procuring goods, 
including the national security implications and the appropriate congressional committees to be 
notified of procurement.168 The Act defines “covered procurement action” as,  
(A) The exclusion of a source that fails to meet qualification standards…for the purpose 
of reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered systems. (B) The exclusion of 
a source that fails to achieve an acceptable rating with regard to an evaluation factor 
providing for the consideration of supply chain risk in the evaluation of proposals for the 
award of a contract or the issuance of a task or delivery order. (C) The decision to 
withhold consent for a contractor to subcontract with a particular source or to direct a 
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contractor for a covered system to exclude a particular source from consideration for a 
subcontract under the contract.169  
 
The National Defense Authorization Act is to be renewed for fiscal year 2016, which does not 
include the cyber SCRM provisions as the 2011 Act.170 On October 22, 2015, President Obama 
vetoed this draft of the bill.171  
The most recent legislative action was the 2016 Appropriations Act, which was signed 
into law in December 2015, and acknowledged cybersecurity by including a section explicitly 
labeled the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. The Act is a ten-year provision that broadens the powers 
of network operators to monitor and disclose information.172 The Act mandates the efforts of the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly develop and make publicly 
available guidelines to help assist and promote the sharing of “cyber threat indicators”173 with 
federal entities.174 This Act is an extension of information sharing that the U.S. government has 
been akin to promoting in recent pieces of legislation.  
 Although information sharing between the public and private sectors is essential to help 
prevent cyberattacks, no duty is imposed on entities to actually abide by the Act. To protect 
against liability, the Act explicitly states that it is not to be construed to “create a duty to share a 
cyber threat indicator or defensive measure; or a duty to warn or act based on the receipt of a 
cyber threat indicator or defensive measure.”175 In addition to not establishing a duty to disclose 
this information, the Act makes no mention of the cyber SCRM principles.   
These legislative initiatives are proof of the importance of cybersecurity, and the growing 
need for standards when dealing with cyberattacks. However, as important as these initiatives 





Private Sector Initiatives 
 
One of the most prominent international private organizations specifically addressing 
cyber SCRM is the Open Group. The Open Group is a “technology consortium dedicated to 
improving business through IT standards.”176 The organization has developed the Open Trusted 
Technology Provider Standard (O-TTPS) and Framework as a “collaborative, business-
developed list of flexible, technology-neutral, and continually updated best practices for supply 
chain security.”177 The Open Group boasts more than 500 member organizations that include 
customers, systems and solutions, suppliers, tool vendors, integrators, consultants, academics, 
and researchers.178 The Mission of the Open Group is to “drive the creation of Boundaryless 
Information” achieved by: 
• Working with customers to capture, understand and address current and emerging 
requirements, establish policies, and share best practices 
• Working with suppliers, consortia and standards bodies to develop consensus and 
facilitate interoperability, to evolve and integrate specifications and open source 
technologies 
• Offering a comprehensive set of services to enhance the operational efficiency of 
consortia 
• Development and operation of the industry’s premier certification service and 
encouraging the procurement of certified products179  
 
Members of the Open Group participate in forums and workshops that allow members to be 
introduced to developing IT standards, and also allow members to interact with peers, experts, 
and industry leaders.180 The Open Group has various certification programs available in both the 
professional realm and products and services realm. The certification programs “provide 
worldwide professional credentials and knowledge” and a “worldwide guarantee of 
conformance” for products and services.181  
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The Open Group publishes many reports and analyses throughout the year regarding trends 
and risk assessments. In the 2015 IT Risk Management Survey Summary, the Open Group in 
association with the Society of Information Risk Analysts (SIRA), and CXOWARE, Inc., 
presented analysis to help enterprises understand their maturity on risk management practices 
and to help identify areas that need additional work.182 The survey questioned 109 IT security 
executives, professionals, analysts and architects, with the majority being Security IT Risk 
Managers.183 
An important observation from the survey results was that risk managers do not tend to rely 
on a single methodology to frame IT, instead the use of multiple frameworks are a part of their 
IT risk management efforts.184 Additionally, it is not surprising that next to regulations, the 
second most common driver for establishing a risk program are external threats (82%), “given 
the large number of external threats and cybersecurity events that have occurred within 
organizations across all industries in the past couple of years.”185 A final observation of the 
survey is the significance of auditing. Of the numerous ways organizations identify risks, 78% of 
companies surveyed use auditing, both internal and external, as major parts of risk management 
programs.186  
A second private organization that addresses cyber risk management is Crowdstrike, which 
specializes in incident response and proactive services and is “a leading provider of next-
generation endpoint protection, threat intelligence, and pre- and post incident response 
services.”187  
Crowdstrike is a subscription-based business that gives customers flexibility to use it as a 
24/7 service in addition to the customer’s own security protocol.188 Crowdstrike customers 
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include some of the largest businesses, along with financial service companies, and sectors 
including energy, oil and gas, telecommunications, retail, and technology.189  
 One of the unique qualities of Crowdstrike is its focus on the adversary as opposed to just 
malicious attacks.190 The company’s Crowdstrike Falcon program is software that detects, 
prevents, and responds to attacks at any stage.191 Falcon “enables customers to prevent damage 
from targeted attacks, detect and attribute malware and adversary in real time, and effortlessly 
search all endpoints, reducing overall incident response time.”192 Crowdstrike recognizes that the 
threat level for a cyber breach has never been higher for organizations trusted with protecting 
valuable data.193 The company’s relevance today is evident by the recent headlines that prove no 
company or agency is completely immune to targeted attacks by skilled adversaries.194 	 In 2014 Crowdstrike published the Global Threat Intel Report that studied the various 
cyber breaches that occurred over the course of the year, from nation-states to point-of-sale 
(PoS) breaches.195 The report concluded that the 2014 cyber adversaries were dynamic, persistent 
and innovative, and to combat these adversaries, defenders must be inventive, diligent, and 
decisive in their efforts.196 The report also determined that the most important advantage for 
defense is having an intelligent defensive team.197 Incorporating intelligence into the daily 
defense of an enterprise will continue to be paramount, and the use of this intelligence is 
essential to stay ahead of the adversary.198  
 The Open Group and Crowdstrike are just two of many private organizations aimed at 
cybersecurity prevention and mitigation. Both of these organizations are extremely efficient in 
their practices and have gained international attention by both the private and public sectors. The 
methods of both organizations should be evaluated by the United States government, and should 
serve as inspiration for cyber SCRM standards within the private sector.  
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International Initiatives – the European Union 
Due to the globalization of the digital world, every country is affected by the threat of 
cyberattack and therefore the need for enhanced cybersecurity it prevalent. While most countries 
have adapted their own various standards to address these growing needs, the European Union 
(EU) has agreed on the implementation of standard rules, mandating each member-country’s 
participation.  
Towards the end of 2015, the EU agreed on its first ever cybersecurity rules.199 The 
“patch-work quilt” of cybersecurity breach notification requirements within some member-
countries, but not within others, has now turned into a pan-European notification obligation.200 
The actual text of the agreement still needs to be formally agreed upon, which will then give 
member-countries 21 months to many any necessary changes to their national legislation.201  
 The cybersecurity rules include the regulating of Internet service providers by requiring 
network companies that provide essential services202 to ensure their infrastructure is secure and 
to report any major security breaches.203 These industries will also be required to fulfill security 
measures to ensure they can withstand cyberattacks.204 
 To ensure cooperation among all member-states, the rules provide for a strategic 
“cooperation group” that will exchange best practices, draw up guidelines, and assist member-
states in the mandatory adoption of the rules.205 In addition, each member-state will be required 
to “set up a network of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), to handle 
incidents and risks, discuss cross-border security issues and identify coordinated responses. The 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) will also play a key role in 
implementing the directive, particularly in relation to cooperation.”206  
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 The EU’s cybersecurity rules are important because the rules integrate the standards 
among essential services, such as energy and transportation, as well as online marketplaces, such 
as eBay and Amazon.207 While the rules for Internet service providers would be less strict than 
those for the essential services sector,208 the EU still acknowledges the importance of including 
those providers. These rules are an excellent example of how the United States could begin to 
standardize cybersecurity within the private sector. 
IV. PROPOSED REGULATORY RESPONSE  
 
Despite the vast number of agencies, sub-agencies, and departments working on 
cybersecurity matters, cyberattacks are still frequent and ferocious.209 Much of these initiatives 
focus on securing the supply chain for public sector needs. While these efforts are an important 
step toward better cybersecurity policy, private sector business interests are not acknowledged, 
even though the private sector has been frequently affected by cyberattacks.210  
The analysis of the current state of the law, legislative and executive initiatives, private 
sector action, and the European Union’s cybersecurity rules, demonstrates that the global IT 
supply chain continues to be unprepared for the increasing number of cyber threats. The United 
States government has been primarily focused on public sector safeguards, leaving the private 
sector - where the majority of cybersecurity breaches occur - with a list of best practices and a 
voluntary framework. Private sector organizations, such as the Open Group and Crowdstrike, 
have been successful in risk prevention and mitigation; however, the scope of these groups does 
not encompass the majority of cyber supply chain stakeholders. Finally, while the European 
Union’s cybersecurity rules are an important start toward standardization, the rules do not 
address supply chain issues. 
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Effective management of cyber SCRM cannot be achieved quickly or by using one-size-
fits-all approaches. To truly combat the issue of cyber SCRM, the United States must address the 
issue in phases. First, the reality of the threat posed to the IT supply chain must be addressed by 
the government, and should form the basis for a national conversation to educate the public and 
businesses about IT supply chain insecurity, its consequences, and preventative steps needed. 
Second, the government should reconceive the role and better deploy existing agencies, such as 
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, as a regulatory mechanism. Third, once the government 
has educated the public and businesses, and addresses cyber SCRM through current agencies, the 
final step is to work toward creating a permanent regulatory structure that is dedicated to and 
expert in resolving cyber SCRM.  
Despite the legislative, executive, and private sector efforts thus far, cyber SCRM is still 
not prioritized. One of the reasons this may be is the fact that many Americans are simply 
unaware of the dire cybersecurity risks within the IT supply chain. If the United States 
government brought cyber SCRM to the forefront of the cybersecurity movement, the public 
demand for more action could compel more regulatory support and initiative. 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is one of the world’s largest law 
enforcement organizations, with a mission that includes safeguarding America’s borders by 
keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the country.211 In 2001, the CBP established the 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) that works with the trade community 
to strengthen international supply chains and improve border security.212 When C-TPAT was 
established, there were seven major partners, a number that today has grown to over 10,000.213 
These 10,000-plus partners account for over 50 percent (by value) of what is imported into the 
country.214 The Partnership allows for better risk assessment and targeting through the use of 
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clear supply chain criteria for partners to meet, and in return provides incentives and benefits, 
such as expedited processing, for compliance.215  
In order to gain and retain membership, partners of C-TPAT must meet certain criteria. 
Upon joining the partnership,  
companies sign an agreement to work with CBP to protect the supply chain, identify 
security gaps, and implement specific security measures and best practices. Additionally, 
partners provide CBP with a security profile outlining the specific security measures the 
company has in place. Applicants must address a broad range of security topics and 
present security profiles that list action plans to align security throughout their supply 
chain.216  
Once the criteria are met, partners are considered low-risk and are less likely to be examined by 
CBP. Low-risk designation is also based on a “company’s past compliance history, security 
profile, and the validation of a sample international supply chain.”217  
Within this process, “C-TPAT routinely highlights security matters for the purpose of 
raising awareness, renewing Partners’ vigilance, and recognizing best practices implemented to 
address supply chain security concerns.”218 In doing so, C-TPAT uses FireEye, one of the 
leaders in cybersecurity solutions, to help partners become aware of their exposure to indirect 
cyberattack through both the supply chain and third-party relationships, as well as to make them 
aware of federal cyber defense resources.219 Currently, C-TPAT is urging its partners to 
“develop an integrated cybersecurity risk management plan that incorporates security controls 
and best practices that mitigate risk associated with advanced cyber threats and the use of 
sophisticated techniques.”220 This includes, NIST’s Framework and Special Publications 
regarding supply chain risk management best practices.221  
The C-TPAT program has been successful incorporating importers, brokers, 
consolidators, carriers, foreign manufacturers, and MPTOs within the 10,000-plus certified 
partners.222 As of December 2014, 26,624 total validations have been completed, resulting in 
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1,947 suspensions and 1,375 removals from the program.223 Because of its success, the program 
has proved to be an asset to CBP.  
While C-TPAT’s strategy of encouraging development of cyber SCRM plans and 
implementing NIST’s cybersecurity best practices will help its partners to help prevent and 
mitigate risk, the C-TPAT program has the potential to have a greater influence on supply chain 
security.  By serving as a level of CBP’s cargo enforcement strategy,224 C-TPAT would be a 
positive first step toward a national regulatory mechanism that specifically regulates imported 
technological devices from the IT supply chain. 
For example, C-TPAT could begin to extend its membership to the largest IT product 
suppliers. The CBP along with the government could begin requiring all IT products imported to 
the United States through the supply chain to be imported by either a partner of C-TPAT or be 
subjected to spot-check audits of products by CBP. The benefits of compliance already offered to 
C-TPAT partners would serve as an incentive to expand membership, thereby warranting a more 
secure supply chain.   
Additionally, incentivizing membership within C-TPAT could potentially standardize the 
flow of products within the IT supply chain. By issuing strict criteria for partners to meet in order 
to import products into the United States, foreign manufacturing companies would likely become 
members in order to be considered “low-risk” and to expedite the product flow.  
Furthermore, though the idea of auditing IT products from foreign adversaries is not 
currently implemented by the United States, it is a practice of other countries, such as China.225 
In early 2015, a deal was reached between China and Apple, Inc. for the auditing of Apple 
products upon arrival to China’s market. China’s State Internet Information Officer requested, 
“spot network security audits” on Apple products “in an effort to counter concerns that other 
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governments are using its devices for surveillance.”226 Although China is one of Apple’s largest 
markets, the country needed assurances that Apple products protect the privacy of its users and 
China’s national security.227 This is a prime example of how auditing products coming into the 
United States from the global supply chain can be managed to effectively prevent and deter 
future cyberattacks. 
While the phased approach of better educating the public, redeploying current federal 
agencies, and beginning to establish a permanent regulatory structure to address cyber SCRM is 
only a preliminary approach, the United States should use its available resources to begin 
addressing cyber SCRM. Such standards would need to be flexible in order to adapt to each 
various sector of business in the cyber supply chain because with such diverse IT fields within 
each industry, a uniform set of standards would simply be ineffective. The United States can 
look to the agencies and organizations mentioned in this note as examples to help address cyber 
SCRM strategies that could help the United States effectively reach the ultimate goal of creating 
a permanent regulatory mechanism.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Federal government agencies and private businesses have very different cybersecurity 
standards. As described above, there are very specific executive and legislative actions that set 
out to standardize government acquisition of products from the supply chain, yet there are no 
clear standards for the private sector to follow, even though both the public and private sector 
interests rely heavily on the IT supply chain. While the private sector does have access to private 
organizations that offer security products and services, not all global IT supply chain 
stakeholders are utilizing these organizations. Securing the supply chain would not only benefit 
the public sector’s national security concerns, but would also benefit private sector business 
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whose products are sold to millions of consumers each year. Because of the reliance of both 
public and private sectors on the global supply chain, the United States must begin to implement 
cyber SCRM within IT supply chains vis-à-vis federal agencies already in existence. The U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection’s C-TPAT is a prime candidate to begin this implementation. By 
slowly implementing a cyber SCRM mechanism, the United States can begin to effectively 
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